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 Chapter 11 
 Where Water Meets Agriculture: 
The Ambivalent Role of Water Users 
Associations 
 Timothy  Moss and  Ahmad  Hamidov 
 Abstract  This chapter investigates the role of water users associations (WUAs) in 
managing the Fergana Valley’s irrigation system at a local level. WUAs were estab-
lished in the Uzbek section of the Fergana Valley only from the early 2000s onwards 
and are generally not regarded as having been effective to date, although individual 
instances of modestly successful WUAs indicate their future potential as viable 
entities for collective modes of water management. This chapter begins by explain-
ing the origins, purpose and structure of WUAs in the Fergana Valley as set out in 
policy guidelines and then contrasts this with a study of how they are working in 
practice. In the concluding section, the effectiveness of WUAs in the Uzbek section 
of the Fergana Valley is assessed in terms of criteria derived from the literature. This 
chapter reveals that Uzbekistan’s WUAs lack the funding, water user representation 
and resources to tackle the major structural problems confronting Fergana Valley’s 
post-socialist irrigation system. Their heavy dependence on powerful institutional 
regimes for irrigation and for agriculture also severely restricts their action. There 
exist important exceptions, where WUAs are exploring innovative ways of coping 
with the enormity of their tasks, in isolation and in collaboration, but these represent 
only a small minority of WUAs in the region and are, to a large extent, dependent 
on temporary donor funding. 
 Keywords  Water users associations •  Water governance •  Institutions •  Path depen-
dency •  Transformation •  Fergana Valley •  Integrated water resources management 
•  Participation •  Irrigation •  Education 
 T.  Moss (*) 
 Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning (IRS) , 
 Flakenstraße 28-31 ,  15537  Erkner ,  Germany 
 e-mail: MossT@irs-net.de 
 A.  Hamidov 
 Department of Agricultural Economics ,  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin , 
 Philippstraße 13 ,  10099  Berlin ,  Germany 
150
11.1  WUAs in the Global Discourse on Integrated Water 
Resources Management 
 Over the past century, the world has witnessed an almost threefold increase in the 
total area of irrigated agriculture (Ostrom  1992 ). Representing 20 % of total crop-
land, irrigated agriculture produces more than 40 % of the world’s total agricultural 
output (Perry  2007 , p. 369). Expansion of irrigated agricultural areas has been a key 
component of nation-building processes (Kreutzmann  2015 , in this volume) and, in 
recent decades, the construction and modernisation of large-scale irrigation facili-
ties has become the target of massive investment programmes of international donor 
agencies in developing and transition countries. However, towards the late twentieth 
century, the management and operation of irrigation systems, particularly at the 
community level, proved an increasing fi scal burden for many governments. As 
central government funds in many countries were reduced, maintenance standards 
declined and irrigation infrastructure began to deteriorate at a serious rate (World 
Bank  2007 ). One of the main solutions widely voiced from the early 1990s onwards 
has been the creation of so-called water users associations (WUAs), in which farm-
ers are given more responsibility to manage and maintain local irrigation systems 
themselves. 
 WUAs have been defi ned as “a voluntary, nongovernmental, non-profi t entity 
established and managed by groups of farmers located along one or several water-
course canals” (Winrock International  2007 , cited in Gunchinmaa and Yakubov 
 2010 , p. 166). Ideally, WUAs are set up by a group of farmers and other water users 
along one or more hydrological subsystems or watercourses to collectively manage, 
operate, maintain and develop a local irrigation and drainage system. Membership 
is based on contracts and/or agreements between the members and the WUA. In 
accordance with WUA by-laws, their main responsibilities generally include:
•  Ensuring reliable distribution of water amongst water users 
•  Determining and collecting irrigation service fees 
•  Resolving disputes on water use and management of the irrigation system in an 
appropriate, transparent and democratic manner 
•  Maintaining, refurbishing and improving the irrigation system in the WUA oper-
ational area 
 Within the global debate on water resources management, the wide appeal of 
WUAs can be attributed not merely to the inherent advantages emanating from the 
self-organisation of local irrigation infrastructures by the farmers that use them but 
also to the various ways in which WUAs – on paper at least – play to the dominant 
discursive paradigm of integrated water resources management (IWRM) (for a defi -
nition of IWRM, see GWP  2000 , p. 22). Within the global discourse on IWRM, 
increasing the involvement and responsibility of water users in water management 
issues has become a central tenet for successful implementation. Decentralising 
decision-making powers and strengthening the role of local water users is also 
acknowledged as a core element of IWRM in Central Asia and post-socialist 
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 transition countries in general (Dombrowsky et al.  2011 ; Dukhovny et al.  2013 ). 
Globally, WUAs are projected to play a critical role in promoting IWRM reform at 
the community level. 
 Whilst the aspirations for WUAs are high, it is now recognised that, to be suc-
cessful, they are hugely dependent on favourable conditions. On the basis of past 
experiences worldwide, Merrey ( 1996 , p. 4, also cited in Gunchinmaa and Yakubov 
 2010 , p. 168) cites four principles as preconditions for an effective WUA. These are 
(1) a supportive institutional environment, (2) the capacity to operate and maintain 
infrastructure, (3) the benefi ts of user participation exceeding the costs and (4) 
effective collective choice arrangements. We will use these four principles to assess 
the performance of the Fergana Valley WUAs in Sect.  11.4. 
 Experiences from around the world indicate that some WUAs do live up to the 
aspirations placed in them and benefi t from favourable institutional frameworks, at 
least in part. Frequently cited instances of largely successful WUAs include those 
created in Mexico in response to the economic crisis of the late 1980s, when respon-
sibility for local irrigation management and infrastructure was transferred to water 
users (Rap and Wester  2013 ). In Turkey, WUAs were set up as part of a national 
decentralisation policy in response to the inability of the State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI) to continue funding the operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure 
(Uysal and Atis  2010 ). In Nepal, experience indicates that farmers with long-term 
irrigation management traditions can, through the development of autonomous and 
self-governing WUAs, improve communication, develop their own agreements, 
regulate compliance and sanction those who do not comply with their own rules 
(Ostrom  2000 , p. 4). Such groups were able to distribute water equitably and keep 
their irrigation systems better maintained than those systems run by central govern-
ment agencies ( ibid ). These examples corroborate the expectations placed in WUAs 
to enable people within a community to pool their resources (e.g. knowledge, exper-
tise and money), to allocate water more effectively amongst members, to keep irri-
gation and drainage infrastructure in a good condition, to resolve water-related 
disputes and to impose sanction mechanisms against noncontributors or rule- 
breaking individuals. 
 Many other examples from around the world, however, present a very different 
story of failure and confl ict. The diffi culties encountered in setting up and operating 
WUAs are manifold and include fi nancial, political, institutional and administrative 
constraints. The driving forces for establishing WUAs differ hugely from country to 
country, depending on political and economic circumstances (World Bank  2007 ). In 
most places, the development of WUAs was promoted either through government 
programmes or by external donor-funded investment projects. These reforms often 
disregarded local knowledge and experiences. Instead, policies drew on blueprint 
models with little consideration for the specifi c sociopolitical context of a country 
and its institutional capacities. Moreover, implementation mostly followed a top- 
down bureaucratic approach, allowing little space for the active involvement of civil 
society (Theesfeld  2005 ; Yalcin and Mollinga  2007 ; Abdullaev et al.  2010 ). 
 A closer review of the literature on post-socialist countries shows that the strong 
push of the World Bank and other donor agencies to establish WUAs in  communities 
11 Where Water Meets Agriculture: The Ambivalent Role of Water Users Associations
152
neither provided for functional local irrigation sector management nor involved 
local water users in their creation (Theesfeld  2005 ). As a result, many WUAs (e.g. 
in Bulgaria) terminated after one irrigation season ( ibid ). Sehring ( 2009 ) reports 
that newly established WUAs in post-socialist Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are under-
mined by informal practices such as patronage and unauthorised water withdrawal. 
If the WUAs’ tasks are to deliver water to its members in due time, keep irrigation 
and drainage canals maintained, punish those who do not comply with rules and 
resolve confl icts within the WUA, they were barely effective on the ground ( ibid ). 
Instead, when the head of the WUA was a local patron, he/she was in most cases 
able to ensure compliance with water rules using the authority of his position 
(Sehring  2009 ). Despite Central Asian governments issuing decrees on the estab-
lishment of WUAs and creating thousands of WUAs within a very short period of 
time, in reality most of them exist on paper only (Wegerich  2009 ; Abdullaev et al. 
 2010 ). Consequently, many commentators see WUAs in Central Asia as inactive 
and not fi nancially viable (Wegerich  2000 ; Abdullaev et al.  2010 ). A low level of 
user participation and frequent external interventions into WUA internal procedures 
are additional constraints for WUAs’ malfunctioning in Central Asia (Schlüter et al. 
 2010 ). In the following section, we take a closer look fi rst at the origin and purpose 
of WUAs in the Fergana Valley (Sect.  11.2 ) and then study how they are working in 
practice (Sect.  11.3 ) before assessing their effectiveness in terms of the criteria 
listed above (Sect.  11.4 ). 
11.2  WUAs as Building Blocks of Irrigation Management 
in the Fergana Valley 
 The emergence and practice of WUAs in the Fergana Valley cannot be understood 
without appreciating the history of irrigation management in the region. The chapter 
by Hermann Kreutzmann, analysing the trajectory of large-scale irrigation from 
Tsarist times to the present day, provides the necessary insight into the economic, 
political and sociocultural factors which have shaped this major water engineering 
project (Kreutzmann  2015 , in this volume). In our chapter, we recollect three key 
factors of Fergana’s irrigation system: its strong path dependency in both material 
and social terms, the powerful interdependence of water management and agricul-
tural production and the confl ictual nature of transboundary cooperation between 
today’s independent post-socialist republics. 
11.2.1  Early Origins of WUAs 
 In the Fergana Valley, WUAs were fi rst established in the mid-1990s in Kyrgyzstan 
(Sehring  2009 ) but only in the early 2000s in Tajikistan ( ibid ) and in Uzbekistan 
(Hamidov  2007 ; Abdullaev et al.  2009 ). In all instances, the driving forces behind 
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these reforms included the deterioration of on-farm water infrastructure, unequal 
distribution of water, frequent confl icts amongst water users, ineffi cient irrigation 
methods and signifi cant reduction of the state budget for local irrigation administra-
tion. In the case of Uzbekistan, for example, during 1991–2000, there was a serious 
deterioration of the secondary and tertiary canal systems because former collective 
and state farms could not operate and maintain irrigation canals due to inadequate 
funding. This resulted in low yields and, subsequently, low incomes for farmers. 
Meanwhile, the distribution of irrigation water became severely unequal, especially 
for downstream farmers. Disputes amongst farmers over water increased. It became 
important to introduce farmer-based organisations in place of the poorly functioning 
collective farms. In 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) 
of Uzbekistan contracted the Irrigation and Water Problems Research Institute (for-
mer SANIIRI) to study the experience of different countries with WUAs and to set 
up a framework for the establishment of WUAs. In 1999, SANIIRI completed the 
study and presented its recommendations to MAWR. As a result, the fi rst WUA was 
created in Uzbekistan in February 2000 in the Khorezm Region (Hamidov  2007 ). 
The fi rst WUAs in the Uzbek section of the Fergana Valley were founded in January 
2002 (MAWR RUz  2014 ). 
 Critical behind the emergence of WUAs was the IWRM Fergana project funded 
by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation from 2001 onwards. This 
transboundary project helped institutionalise IWRM as the guiding policy paradigm 
for the region (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov  2010 , p. 166; Dukhovny et al.  2013 ). A 
key element of this IWRM-inspired reform process was to transfer operation and 
maintenance responsibilities for on-farm irrigation to water users in the form of 
WUAs. This new governance structure at the lower level was, in theory at least, 
intended to encourage local farmers to act collectively in managing and maintaining 
their irrigation systems. Additional institutional arrangements, such as the irrigation 
service fee, were also introduced by this reform. 
11.2.2  Organisational Structure of WUAs 
 Unlike in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, there is no specifi c law on 
WUAs in Uzbekistan (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov  2010 , p. 173). The legal basis 
for their status and organisation is provided primarily by the Cabinet of Ministers’ 
Decree No.8, approved in 2002, which determines WUAs as the entity responsi-
ble for irrigation management at on-farm level in Uzbekistan. Subsequently, the 
reformed national Water and Water Use Act of 29 December 2009 clarifi ed the 
role of WUAs, specifying for instance that WUAs are required to deal with inter-
nal confl icts relating to water distribution amongst water users (Art. 2.1) and that 
they should cooperate with state agencies in protecting and conserving water 
(Art. 10). National policy guidelines require WUAs to be organised around two 
units: a decision-making body and a management body (ADB  2006 ). Figure  11.1 
provides an example of the typical structure of a WUA in Uzbekistan. The upper 
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part of the hierarchy comprises the general assembly, the WUA council and the 
audit committee; the lower part comprises the management team of chairman and 
specialist staff.
 The supreme governing body of the WUA is the  general assembly . The policy 
guideline specifi es that the assembly should meet twice a year, when all members 
of the WUA are invited and encouraged to participate. When a member is unable to 
attend, he/she assigns a representative (usually a neighbouring farmer in the same 
WUA) to report on key messages emerging from the meeting. The main topics of 
discussion include electing a chairman, determining irrigation service fees (ISFs), 
evaluating the performance of the WUA management team and identifying the 
dates for maintaining on-farm irrigation canals through  khashars , voluntary action 
of groups of people living in the community. In her study, Zavgorodnyay ( 2006 ) 
points to the fact that, in practice, the general assembly does not play a major role 
in the decision-making process. Instead, the chairman closely collaborates with the 
director of local machinery tractor parks (which provide agricultural machinery 
services to WUA members) and the head of the village citizens’ assembly to reach 
decisions ( ibid ). 
 The primary task of a  WUA council is to supervise and monitor the fi nancial and 
technical activities of the WUA. Members of the WUA council work without sala-
ries and are required to meet at least once a month. Typically, a WUA council has 
about fi ve members elected by the assembly. The task of the  audit committee is to 
General Assembly  (all water users) or








WUA Chairman  
Irrigation & Land Reclamation Specialist,
Mirabs, Hydro-metering Specialist, 
Accountant, Pump Operator and Engineer 
 
 Fig. 11.1  Internal structure of a typical WUA in Uzbekistan (Source: ADB  2006 ) 
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conduct an annual review of all fi nancial records and bank transfers of the 
WUA. The committee members are elected during the general assembly meeting 
and they report directly to the assembly. A WUA accountant assists the committee 
during the assessment. 
 Additionally, there is a  WUA management team to manage a WUA’s activity on 
a daily basis. This team includes the WUA manager, elected by the general assem-
bly, an accountant and technical staff (e.g.  mirab – or “water master” – and engi-
neers), with its activities paid for through ISFs. The manager’s responsibility is to 
handle irrigation-related activities in the WUA territory, identify potential irrigation 
canals to be maintained and initiate  khashars , prepare the annual budget of the 
WUA and calculate irrigation service fees (ISFs) for both members (farmers) and 
non-members (e.g. local households). The WUA accountant is responsible for the 
overall fi nancial activities of the association. He/she is in charge of collecting ISFs. 
11.2.3  Spatial Reform of WUAs 
 A major reform to WUAs in Uzbekistan subsequent to their creation in the early 2000s 
was their spatial reorganisation around hydrographic, rather than administrative, units 
in accordance with IWRM principles (Dukhovny et al.  2013 , p. 184; see Chap.  8 , Moss 
and Dobner  2015 , in this volume). With Decree No. 320 of the Cabinet of Ministers of 
July 2003 on “improving the organisation of water resources management”, the Uzbek 
state started reforming its water sector based on a policy of decentralisation. A key 
element of this reform was to create a basin irrigation systems authority (BISA) in 
place of the former regional water resources management department ( OblVodKhoz ) 
and to establish irrigation systems authorities (ISAs) as well as main canal authorities 
(MCA), subordinated to BISA, in place of district water resources management depart-
ments ( RayVodKhoz ). As a result, the number of local water organisations was reduced. 
For example, 12 administrative organisations at provincial level were replaced by 10 
BISAs in 2003. In the Fergana Valley within Uzbekistan, which includes three prov-
inces (Andijan, Fergana and Namangan), three BISAs were created: Naryn-Karadarya, 
Naryn-Syrdarya and Syrdarya-Soh. Furthermore, 13 ISAs and 5 CMOs were also 
established as a result of the 2003 decree. 
 At the lower level of the water management hierarchy, this decree called for 
reorganising WUAs spatially around the local canal network, rather than adminis-
trative territories. Wegerich ( 2009 ) points out that at the WUA level the shift did not 
incorporate the drainage system but focused solely on the infrastructure delivery 
system. Since this reform, equity in the allocation of water supply per hectare has 
increased within the Khorezm province, the lower part of the Amudarya basin 
( ibid ). Dukhovny et al. ( 2013 ) also report that the transition to the hydrographic 
principle in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan brought positive outcomes in terms of 
water distribution equity between up- and downstream communities. However, they 
also acknowledge that the transition to hydrographic units of management is not yet 
complete in the Fergana Valley as a whole ( ibid ). 
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11.2.4  Current Status of WUAs 
 By the end of 2013, 1510 WUAs had been established in Uzbekistan, serving nearly 
57,000 individual farmers and covering about 4.2 million ha (MAWR RUz  2014 ). 
Within the Fergana Valley, comprising three provinces of Uzbekistan, the total num-
ber of WUAs is 380. On average, each WUA covers about 2200 ha, varying signifi -
cantly between different provinces (see Table  11.1 ). As a result of the state’s land 
consolidation policies of 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Moss and Dobner  2015 , in this 
volume), the number of members representing each WUA in the valley has sharply 
declined and, on average, each WUA has now about 50 members. According to data 
from MAWR RUz ( 2014 ), despite the fact that WUAs were initially created from 
the beginning of the 2000s in the Fergana Valley, most associations were re-estab-
lished based on hydrographic principles and reregistered at the Ministry of Justice 
as a non-governmental and non-profi t organisation only in the late 2000s. 
11.3  Fergana Valley’s WUAs in Practice 
 Created by central government decree yet without a clear regulatory mandate or 
fi nancial support, the WUAs in Uzbekistan have faced from the beginning an uphill 
struggle. On paper, they are an integral piece in the hierarchical jigsaw of Uzbek 
water management, fi lling the institutional void for on-farm irrigation systems left 
by the collapse of collective farms. Expectations in their performance were – and 
still are – high, although for a variety of reasons. State water authorities want WUAs 
to keep the existing irrigation system going, donor organisations hope WUAs can 
generate more participatory forms of integrated water resources management, and 
farmers want WUAs to provide them with the water they need for an increasing 
variety of crops. Caught between these multiple claims in a context of severe socio-
economic transformation and deep-seated authoritarian rule, WUAs face an unenvi-
able task. How, then, are they working in practice? To what extent are they fulfi lling 
the expectations placed in them? How far do they meet the principles of success as 
defi ned in the international literature on WUAs? 
 Taking the Uzbek section of the Fergana Valley as our case study area (see 
Fig.  11.2 ), we investigate in this section past and current experiences of WUAs 
working at the interface of water management and agricultural production on the 
 Table 11.1  Distribution of the number of WUAs in the Uzbek section of the Fergana Valley 
 Provinces  No. of WUAs  No. of members  Total irrigated area (ha) 
 Andijan  109  6390  246,278 
 Fergana  124  6098  322,167 
 Namangan  147  5793  273,104 
 Source: MAWR RUz ( 2014 ) 
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farm level. We are interested in revealing how water policy and regulations get 
translated into irrigation management practices on the ground and what informal 
“rules in use” (Ostrom  1990 ) are emerging in response. To this end, we have anal-
ysed the literature on WUAs in the Fergana Valley – in particular studies emerging 
from the IWRM Fergana Valley project funded by the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation – and fi eld notes taken during a study trip visiting various WUAs 
and irrigation authorities in the region in May 2014. The section explores four 
 practices pertinent to the role of WUAs: practices of representation, leadership, 
regulation and education.
11.3.1  Practices of Representation 
 The potential value of WUAs – following the global discourse on IWRM – lies in 
them providing an institutional basis for water users in an irrigation area to manage 
available water resources more effectively and equitably through collective action. 
 Fig. 11.2  Stylised map of the Main Canals in the Uzbek section of the Fergana Valley (Source: 
H. Kreutzmann 2015 in this volume pp. 113–127) 
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This depends on the active participation of the farmers using irrigated water in 
decision- making processes and management practices of WUAs. The ways in which 
water users are represented in WUAs are, thus, of critical importance. In Uzbekistan, 
the top-down, technocratic nature by which WUAs were created in the early 2000s 
set the pattern for the hierarchical and largely unrepresentative design of WUAs in 
the Fergana Valley and elsewhere. Although a prime task of WUAs is to resolve 
disputes over water allocation, requiring close collaboration with farmers, water 
users themselves were neither consulted nor informed about the creation of the 
WUAs and the reorganisation of water management this implied. “Therefore the 
water users considered the WUAs as another water administration imposed on 
them, and not a way of introducing collective action water management” (Abdullaev 
et al.  2010 , p. 1035). 
 Representation of water users within WUAs is generally very weak (Dukhovny 
et al.  2008 ). Council members of WUAs are elected from amongst the water users 
of the irrigation area served, but they are not active in the decision-making process. 
Most WUA councils are ineffective, leaving authority in the hands of the manage-
ment body of paid offi cials and, in particular, the WUA chairman. The infl uence of 
individual farmers is limited, as a rule, to the annual general assembly of the WUA, 
a platform for the WUA management to inform members rather than a forum for 
open debate (WUA Tomchikul). The old Soviet-style command system tends to 
stifl e participatory forms of governance (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov  2010 ). Noting 
also the effects of limited funding, Schlüter et al. conclude from their research that:
 WUAs in Uzbekistan have in reality a poor decision-making mandate, are strongly infl u-
enced by patronage networks and interventions of the khokims (local governors) into their 
internal processes and suffer from a lack of fi nancial means which all contributes to their 
malfunctioning. (Schlüter et al.  2010 , p. 629) 
 In the Uzbek context, then, the term “water users association” is something of a 
misnomer. WUAs are de facto bodies set up by the government to secure state pro-
duction targets for cotton and wheat by maintaining the existing irrigation system 
and ensuring the required allocation of water to the farmers. In short, WUAs in 
Uzbekistan may be acting on the behalf of water users but not at their behest. 
 One indictment of the ineffectiveness and unrepresentative nature of WUAs is the 
recent emergence in the Fergana Valley of water user groups (WUGs) as self- help 
initiatives organised by water users themselves (Dukhovny et al.  2008 ; Abdullaev 
et al.  2010 ). Here, farmers “have taken water management into their own hands”, 
developing their own modes of collective action at the local level to manage water as 
a common pool resource (Abdullaev et al.  2010 , p. 1031). Created by farmers them-
selves, the WUGs in the Fergana Valley have received fi nancial support and advice 
from the IWRM project funded by the SDC and implemented by SIC-ICWC and 
IWMI. The number of WUGs in the South Fergana Canal area alone rose rapidly from 
23 in 2006 to 160 in 2008 (Abdullaev et al.  2010 , p. 1039). Some have emerged out of 
former collective farm brigades, some out of an extended family and others in response 
to a local water distribution confl ict. WUGs not only own and maintain pumps and 
clean the smaller irrigation canals but they also introduce their own rules for water 
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distribution and monitor water allocations, generating new levels of transparency to 
irrigation services (Abdullaev et al.  2010 ). They have no legal status but are proving 
increasingly infl uential as a voice for water users rights, drawing on the authority of 
informal institutions, social norms and local leaders (on informal institutions of irriga-
tion in post-Soviet Central Asia, see Sehring  2009 ). The inclusion of WUG leaders in 
WUA councils is regarded by some commentators as a major step towards transform-
ing WUAs into more participative, responsive organisations acting in water user inter-
ests (Abdullaev et al.  2010 ). These WUG leaders are raising the concerns of local 
farmers in the WUAs, demanding action and offering options for cooperative ven-
tures. Their degree of infl uence depends heavily, however, on the willingness of the 
WUA chairman to share power. 
 A second attempt to improve representation in the South Fergana Canal area is 
the emergence of a Canal Water Users Union of South Fergana Canal in 2005, rep-
resenting the fi rst and only umbrella organisation for WUAs in any region in 
Uzbekistan. It was created with funding from the IWRM Fergana Valley project 
with the task of advising new WUAs and resolving confl icts within and between 
them over water allocation (Abdullaev et al.  2009 ). All 43 WUAs in the top two 
reaches of the South Fergana Canal are members of the union. It works primarily by 
inviting WUA representatives to its central offi ce to discuss differences and is 
unusual in that its activities focus not on technical issues but on people and their 
interaction. Even though the project – together with its funding – has been termi-
nated, the federation continues to operate, paying its seven staff members with fees 
collected from its member organisations. This, in itself, is an indication that the 
federation is regarded as providing a service of value to water users. 
 Issues of representation are by no means restricted to structures and procedures 
within and between WUAs but relate to higher levels of decision-making, where 
WUA interests need articulating. Referring to the representation of WUA leaders in 
councils and committees at subbasin and basin levels, Dukhovny et al. refl ect:
 Our experience shows that the management of WUAs and Canal Water User Committees 
do not participate enough in the processes of water resources planning, allocation, and 
management, as well as in decision making relating to maintaining and rehabilitating of 
water infrastructure and seeking funding sources. (Dukhovny et al.  2008 , p. 28) 
 Within the IWRM pilot areas, there are positive signs that WUAs are being given 
a voice in the water councils of basins and subbasins and in the water committees of 
irrigations systems, but few water offi cials are prepared to view such forms of rep-
resentation as benefi cial to their own position (Dukhovny et al.  2008 , p. 29). 
11.3.2  Practices of Leadership 
 How WUAs are run is, in practice, highly dependent on the people in charge and 
their modes of leadership. The allocation of water via irrigation systems is tradition-
ally the responsibility of the  mirab or “water master”. This practice has not changed 
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with the emergence of WUAs. The  mirab is the sole operator of the weirs, sluices 
and settings regulating the amount of water distributed to each farmer. He/she is the 
one who sanctions farmers that manipulate weirs to their advantage, imposing fi nes 
or a reduction in the water allocation. A WUA is heavily dependent on its chairman, 
who is occasionally the only person in full-time employment. This dependency on 
persons of authority is a product not only of a WUA’s internal structure and staffi ng 
but also of a strong cultural reliance on hierarchical forms of rule in a community. 
In many WUAs, old elites remain fi gures of considerable infl uence. This raises the 
risk of patronage, clientelism and expected codes of conduct (Schlüter et al.  2010 ). 
Here lies the ambivalence of leadership in the Fergana Valley. Strong leadership of 
a WUA or WUG is needed to gain the respect and support of water users internally 
and water offi cials externally. The lack of leadership skills is widely regarded as a 
serious impediment to the performance of WUAs. However, strong leadership can 
be a vehicle for sustaining predominant power relations in a community at the 
expense of inclusive, collaborative modes of governance. 
11.3.3  Practices of Regulation 
 On paper, the tasks of WUAs in regulating water fl ows via irrigation systems are 
straightforward. WUAs are expected to draw up a water use plan for their area, 
distribute water to their members according to this plan, monitor fl ow rates on irri-
gation and drainage canals, keep records of water use, repair and maintain irrigation 
and drainage systems and conduct land reclamation and drainage (Dukhovny et al. 
 2008 ). In practice, their ability to regulate water fl ows is severely constrained not 
only by limited resources but also by the stringent quotas set by higher authorities. 
The water use plan developed by the WUAs in a bottom-up process of data collec-
tion from the farmers on the basis of their water requirements for planned crops is 
frequently rendered redundant by the top-down practice of setting water use quotas 
by state bodies. These quotas emerge from the national Ministry of Agriculture and 
Water Resources and are then passed down the water management hierarchy, being 
translated into quotas for the Basin Irrigation Systems Authority, then for the 
Irrigation Systems Authority at district level and fi nally for the WUAs and the farm-
ers they serve (Kenjabaev  2014 , pp. 16, 26–27; see Fig.  11.3 ). Even this top-down 
allocation regime does not work as intended in practice. Inadequate monitoring and 
lack of staff make it diffi cult for WUAs to ensure adherence to the quotas for irri-
gated water at the fi eld level. More fundamentally, there is a lack of incentive for 
most actors at the local level to adhere to the water-use limits. As Kenjabaev discov-
ered in his research, “[…] neither WUAs nor farmers and other water users have an 
incentive to know the applied and delivered amount of water as no price is set for 
water in Uzbekistan” (Kenjabaev  2014 , p. 27, footnote 6). The result is extensive 
non-compliance of the quotas set by the water authorities.
 The problem is further complicated by the different modes of water regulation 
applied to cash crops on the one hand and household crops on the other. Whereas 
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water allocated for the compulsory crops of cotton and wheat is tightly regulated by 
the WUAs, enabling them to collect fees in return for services, for voluntary crops 
(such as fruit and vegetables) grown by individual households or small cooperatives 
of local residents, water is poorly regulated and rarely paid for. Here, again, there is 
emerging evidence of water users developing their own forms of collective action in 
response to an institutional void. In the WUA Kadyrjon-Azamjon, an unusual sys-
tem of water management has developed whereby a community citizen council 
organises water allocation and cost collection itself. 
 Practices of regulation are, indeed, closely bound to practices of payment for 
irrigation services rendered. WUAs do not receive any state funding as a rule, 
although temporary subsidies can be made available from water management 
 organisations for specifi c measures, such as the reduction of water losses. Also, in 
Uzbekistan, water fees are not levied, in line with the principle that water is a public 
good. Instead of charging for water used, WUAs are dependent on fees for the irriga-
tion services they provide. These irrigation service fees were introduced in Uzbekistan 
only in 2001. They can vary according to the size of the farm and to the type of crop. 
For example, farmers in the WUA Tomchikul pay 45,000 soum 1 per ha for (private) 
orchards but only 20,000 soum per ha for cotton fi elds (excursion in WUA 
Tomchikul). The incentives for farmers to conserve water are, under this system, 
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minimal. Furthermore, the non-payment of fees for irrigation services is a major 
problem for almost all WUAs in the region, seriously limiting their scope for action 
and, thereby, undermining their effectiveness. An attempt in the mid-2000s in the 
Bukhara province to price water on a consumption, rather than a per-unit-of- area, 
basis failed for political reasons out of fear of protests by the WUA’s members (inter-
view with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation). Experiences such 
as this reinforce a technical-managerial approach to the work of WUAs, in which 
engineering solutions are applied to what are essentially social problems. Under such 
circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that ecological issues, relating either to 
local watercourses and water-based landscapes or the state of the entire river basin, 
are not addressed by WUAs at all. 
11.3.4  Practices of Education 
 Several WUAs that are active – in particular those selected as pilots for IWRM 
projects – are offering training for their members on how to optimise irrigation 
practices. Faced with a large number of new farmers, following land reforms, with 
little or no experience of managing crops themselves, many WUAs pursue an edu-
cational mission. The WUAs provide information and expertise to their members in 
the form of events, brochures, experimental and demonstration sites and advice by 
agricultural advisors (see Fig.  11.4 ). Beyond technical knowledge, this educational 
programme is intended to encourage greater self-responsibility amongst farmers 
accustomed to relying on the state but also to promote greater willingness to pay the 
WUAs for the services they provide.
 This educational mission does not stop at the boundaries of the WUAs but is a 
central feature of irrigation management in post-Soviet Uzbekistan in general and 
of the IWRM project in the Fergana Valley in particular. Substantive training pro-
grammes for irrigation managers are provided by the Central ICWC Training Centre 
in Tashkent, with branches in the provinces of Andijan, Fergana and Khodjent (see 
Fig.  11.5 ). Training schemes funded by the IWRM Fergana Valley project provide 
extension services at the level of BISAs, ISAs and WUAs, with the active support 
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. They also target the cre-
ation of more WUGs in the Fergana Valley. The emphasis placed on scientifi c 
knowledge and its application in the fi eld resonates powerfully with Soviet practices 
of training irrigation specialists and Soviet imagery of the heroic water engineer 
making barren lands fertile in the name of national modernisation.
 Nevertheless, these educational schemes have a number of drawbacks. Firstly, 
their reliance on project-based funding makes their long-term sustainability ques-
tionable. Secondly, they focus largely on technical and managerial issues, offering 
little help to practitioners when it comes to dealing with disputes over water alloca-
tions, developing an appreciation of environmental impacts and constraints or 
exploring economic incentives for water conservation. What is lacking is a multidis-
ciplinary, cross-sectoral and basin-oriented approach to irrigation training. In this 
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 Fig. 11.4  Information and training material on irrigation practices at the WUA Kadyrjon-Azamjon 
(Photo: T. Moss) 





sense, the educational programmes on offer are struggling to fi nd their way between 
a Soviet tradition reliant on huge amounts of technical data generated by large teams 
of specialised scientists on the one hand and modern requirements for different 
kinds of knowledge provided under the auspices of a much reduced budget for irri-
gation research on the other (see Fig.  11.6 ).
11.4  WUAs as Models for Emulation? 
 The experience of WUAs in the Uzbek section of the Fergana Valley – and not only 
there – is a sobering one. Whilst it is perhaps inevitable that the WUAs could never 
meet all the expectations made of them at their inception, their general lack of 
impact on irrigation services and water governance is indicative of deeper, structural 
weaknesses in water and land management. WUAs in Uzbekistan are, in essence, 
not really water users associations at all, in that they were created by central govern-
ment decree, permit only minimal representation of water users and operate to sat-
isfy state targets for cash crops in accordance with state quotas for water allocation. 
Thus they fail to meet the defi nition of WUAs given in Sect.  11.1 . They also fail to 
fulfi l any of Merrey’s four principles for successful WUAs, also cited above. The 
 Fig. 11.6  The research station of SANIIRI: a shadow of its former self (Photo: T. Moss) 
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institutional environment within which they operate is not supportive, providing for 
little funding whilst demanding a high degree of conformity (1). Their capacity to 
operate and maintain irrigation infrastructure is severely limited not only by a lack 
of money but also by an inability to mobilise support from water users (2). Many 
WUAs in the region are clearly not convinced that the benefi ts of water user partici-
pation outweigh the transaction costs involved (3). As a result, WUAs generally 
have proven unable to develop effective collective choice arrangements in manag-
ing water and water infrastructures (4). In terms of the fi rst core challenge set out in 
Chap.  8 , (Moss and Dobner  2015 , in this volume) – relating to the water-land 
nexus – they are caught between two powerful institutional regimes, for irrigation 
and for agriculture, respectively, with each placing unrealistic and unsustainable 
demands on WUAs. Prospects for integrated rural development, taking a cross- 
sectoral approach to the water-land-food nexus, are currently poor. The story of 
WUAs in the Fergana Valley is also a rich portrayal of the tensions emerging from 
parallel trends of path dependency and transformation – the second core challenge 
addressed in this part of the book. The legacy of the Soviet era lives on in many 
informal institutions and formal structures of irrigation management. At the same 
time, the WUAs are having to cope with enormous changes in the wake of post-
Soviet land reforms, transboundary relations and emergent modes of governance. 
 There are important exceptions to this negative picture, situations where WUAs 
are exploring innovative ways of coping with the enormity of their tasks, but they 
represent only a small minority of WUAs in the region and are, to a large extent, 
dependent on temporary donor funding. The rapid growth of WUGs is perhaps the 
most promising recent development in irrigation governance in the Fergana Valley, 
as it represents an emergent desire of farmers to make their own collective arrange-
ments for water management. It is, however, too early to reach any judgement on 
how they are likely to work in the future and what impact they might have on the 
practices of WUAs. What current experiences of WUGs indicate is that strengthen-
ing the decision-making powers of water users can generate amongst them a greater 
sense of collective responsibility for managing water and land in a more sustainable 
way and that this can, in favourable circumstances, stimulate learning processes at 
the WUA level too. In terms of the future, this recent development would seem to 
resonate with what Lankford and Hepworth call the “bazaar” model of water man-
agement ( 2010 ). Rather than a “cathedral” model of hierarchical, monocentric rule, 
the authors suggest that a polycentric model (the “bazaar”), in which various organ-
isational forms coexist, is especially suited to situations characterised by little reli-
able data, fl uctual water supply and demand and under-resourced regulatory 
agencies – all factors prevalent in the Fergana Valley. 
 Field Trips and Discussions 
 1.  Central Offi ce of Fergana Irrigation District, Fergana, 4 May 2014 
 2.  Offi ce of South Fergana Canal Management, 5 May 2014 
 3.  WUA Kadyrjon-Azamjon, 5 May 2014 
 4.  Federation of WUAs of South Fergana subbasin, 5 May 2014 
 5.  SANIIRI Research Station, 6 May 2014 
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 6.  Automated irrigation management system, Uchkurgan, 7 May 2014 
 7.  WUA Tomchikul, 7 May 2014 
 8.  Marhamat Vocational College, Andijan, 7 May 2014 
 9.  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 8 May 2014 
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